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Three Types of Structural 
Discrimination Introduced 
by Autonomous Vehicles 
Hin-Yan Liu* 
The advent of autonomous vehicles has been hailed by commentators as 
introducing an improvement for traffic safety by promising to reduce the 
overall number of road accidents as the technology matures. Some 
advocates even hint at a moral imperative to structure incentives and 
smooth over barriers in order to induce widespread usage of autonomous 
vehicle in order to actualize this potential. The orientation towards safety 
concerns, however, foregrounds the debate on crash-optimization and 
imports the trolley-problem thought-experiments to the question of 
autonomous vehicles. 
 
 * Copyright © 2018 Hin-Yan Liu. Associate Professor, Centre for International 
Law, Conflict and Crisis, and Coordinator, Artificial Intelligence and Legal Disruption 
Research Group, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. Email: hin-
yan.liu@jur.ku.dk. I would like to thank Senior Online Editor Lugar Sungil Choi for 
his insightful comments and engaging discussions that greatly improved this Article. 
This is an updated and broadened version of an argument first aired at 
RoboPhilosophy 2016 at the University of Aarhus, Hin-Yan Liu, Structural 
Discrimination and Autonomous Vehicles: Immunity Devices, Trump Cards and Crash 
Optimisation, in WHAT SOCIAL ROBOTS CAN AND SHOULD DO 164 (Johanna Seibt, Marco 
Nørskov, & Søren Schack Andersen eds., 2016), and subsequently elaborated in Hin-
Yan Liu, Irresponsibilities, Inequalities and Injustice for Autonomous Vehicles, 19 ETHICS 
& INFO. TECH. 193 (2017). 
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This paper examines the potential for three types of structural 
discrimination to be woven into the fabric of these developments. First, 
given the emphasis placed upon decisional agency by trolley-problem 
scenarios, there will be systematic privileging of the occupant vis-à-vis 
pedestrians and other third-parties. Second, there is the prospect for 
structural discrimination arising from the coordinated modes of 
autonomous vehicle behavior that is prescribed by its code, or which is 
converged upon through learning algorithms operating towards similar 
goals and within similar constraints. This leads to the potential for 
hitherto individuated outcomes to be networked and thereby multiplied 
across fleets of vehicles. The aggregated effects of such algorithmic policy 
preferences will thus cumulate in the reallocation of benefits and burdens 
to certain categories of persons in a relatively stable manner. This in turn 
raises the spectre of a more pernicious form of active structural 
discrimination where the possibility of crash-optimization casts a 
protective shield over certain individuals at the cost of third-parties. 
Third, the introduction of autonomous vehicles within the framework of 
crash-optimization will likely precipitate infrastructural changes, which 
in a literal sense, will introduce or exacerbate structural forms of 
discrimination with regard to human access to public space. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Autonomous vehicles are now reaching the statistical mileage that 
human drivers on average cause a fatality,1 and have reportedly killed 
a pedestrian on public roads.2 While human statistics may not be 
indicative of the standard for autonomous vehicle performance, this 
unfortunate milestone raises an opportunity to discuss the potential 
for improved road safety that an integrated system incorporating such 
vehicles might allow. Some commentators imply a societal benefit of 
introducing autonomous vehicles,3 while others suggest that there 
might be moral reasons to tailor regulation that is conducive to the 
development of such vehicles if there are good reasons to favor their 
introduction.4 
While there are significant technical factors and statistical evidence 
suggesting that autonomous vehicles will be capable of superior 
performance in driving activities compared to human drivers, the rush 
towards discussions of crash-optimization should be tempered with 
considerations for unintended consequences. Patrick Lin has provided 
an excellent analyses of many relevant ethical issues associated with 
crash-optimization and the application of trolley-problem ethics to the 
functioning of autonomous vehicles.5 The idea of crash-optimization is 
 
 1 See Martin Robbins, Statistically, Self-Driving Cars Are About to Kill Someone. 
What Happens Next?, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016, 5:39 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/jun/14/statistically-self-driving-cars-are-
about-to-kill-someone-what-happens-next (noting that it takes one hundred million 
miles for a human driver to cause a fatality in the United States). 
 2 See Ian Bogost, Can You Sue a Robocar?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/can-you-sue-a-robocar/556007/ 
(reporting the death of a pedestrian by Uber’s autonomous vehicle in Tempe, Florida). 
 3 See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between 
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2012) 
(implying a widespread use of autonomous vehicles if they reduce the frequency and 
severity of accidents); see also Federal Automated Vehicles Policy: Accelerating the Next 
Revolution in Roadway Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. (2016), 
https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/av/pdf/Federal_Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf. 
 4 See Alexander Hevelke & Julian Nida-Rümelin, Responsibility for Crashes of 
Autonomous Vehicles: An Ethical Analysis, 21 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 619, 621 
(2015) (“If there are good moral reasons for finding the . . . introduction of 
autonomous cars to be desirable, this can produce a moral obligation for the state to 
fashion the legal responsibility for crashes of autonomous cars in a way which helps 
the development . . . of autonomous cars.”). 
 5 Patrick Lin, Why Ethics Matters for Autonomous Cars, in AUTONOMES FAHREN 69 
(Markus Maurer et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Why Ethics Matters]; see also Patrick Lin, 
Here’s a Terrible Idea: Robot Cars with Adjustable Ethics Settings, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2014, 6:30 
AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/heres-a-terrible-idea-robot-cars-with-adjustable-
ethics-settings/ [hereinafter Adjustable Ethics Settings]; Patrick Lin, The Robot Car of 
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essentially that the overall damage that ensues from an unavoidable 
crash, determined from an objective standpoint, could be limited and 
even consciously minimized.6 This framing imports clear analogies 
with the much-discussed trolley-problem thought-experiments.7 At 
root, the trolley-problem presents variations of a restrained choice: 
undertake an action that will result in quantitatively less harm, or 
passively allow events to unfold that will result in greater objective 
harm.8 Recent applications of the trolley-problem to the introduction 
of autonomous vehicles have sparked a debate about how to 
appropriately program such vehicles to function in precisely such 
exigencies and by extension how to minimize unavoidable harms 
more generally.9 Given the projections of autonomous vehicle 
performance, the implementation of layered redundancies, and the 
prospect for constant networked communication in a broader traffic 
system dominated by autonomous vehicles, engineers project that 
unavoidable crash scenarios will be rare and decreasing phenomena.10 
 
Tomorrow May Just be Programmed to Hit You, WIRED (May 6, 2014, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/05/the-robot-car-of-tomorrow-might-just-be-programmed-to-
hit-you/ [hereinafter The Robot Car]. 
 6 See Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 5, at 72 (“Some accidents are 
unavoidable — such as when an animal or pedestrian darts out in front of your 
moving car — and therefore autonomous cars will need to engage in crash-
optimization as well. Optimizing crashes means to choose the course of action that will 
likely lead to the least amount of harm, and this could mean a forced choice between 
two evils . . . .” (emphasis in original)); see also Lin, Adjustable Ethics Settings, supra 
note 5 (explaining the trolley-problem as a moral dilemma, in that it is generally 
better to harm fewer people than more, to have one person die instead of five). 
 7 See generally DAVID EDMONDS, WOULD YOU KILL THE FAT MAN? THE TROLLEY 
PROBLEM AND WHAT YOUR ANSWER TELLS US ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG (2013) 
(discussing the trolley-problem through the history of moral philosophy). 
 8 For an overview, see id. 
 9 See, e.g., Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 5; Jean-François Bonnefon et al., 
The Social Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles, SCI., June 2016, at 1573, 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/352/6293/1573.full; Lauren Cassani Davis, 
Would You Pull the Trolley Switch? Does it Matter?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2015) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/trolley-problem-history-
psychology-morality-driverless-cars/409732/; Cory Doctorow, The Problem with Self-
Driving Cars: Who Controls the Code?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:00 AM) 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/23/the-problem-with-self-driving-
cars-who-controls-the-code; Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Autonomous Cars, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-ethics-of-
autonomous-cars/280360/. 
 10 See Aarian Marshall, To Save the Most Lives, Deploy (Imperfect) Self-Driving Cars 
ASAP, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/self-
driving-cars-rand-report/. But see Peter Hancock, Are Autonomous Cars Really 
Safer Than Human Drivers?, CONVERSATION (Feb. 2, 2018, 6:29 AM), 
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These practical assertions need not detract from the considerations 
elaborated upon in this paper, however, because the prospect for 
accidents, by definition, can never be entirely eliminated. 
Furthermore, the debate on crash-optimization and the application of 
trolley-problem ethics to autonomous vehicle operations constitutes 
an attempt to engage with the moral, social, and legal implications that 
such technologies introduce, as well as highlight the alignment of 
interests undergirding the widespread commercial introduction of a 
new mode of transport. 
It is interesting that Patrick Lin transforms the impulse towards 
crash-optimization into targeting practices, leading to discussions and 
burgeoning empirical studies as to whether autonomous vehicles 
should be programed to kill at least in constrained contexts.11 The 
question remains, however, whether results of rule-based and 
sequentially cumulative decisions, which the current autonomous 
vehicles must comply with, can amount to targeting and thus harming 
individuals per se. There are three reasons for this. First, targeting 
implies a direct and intentional action against a pre-identifiable target, 
while trolley-problem style accident scenarios involve coerced, time-
restricted choices that curtail the scope of volition and furthermore are 
not necessarily aimed at harming a particular victim. Second, targeting 
is to a large extent decontextualized and preordained, while trolley-
problem style accident scenarios set strong situational contexts which 
constrain decisions by placing parameters upon the range of possible 
actions. Third, unlike targeting, autonomous vehicle programming 
does not determine particular future outcomes, but instead establishes 
probabilistic courses of action in given contexts. The point here is that 
the programming of the autonomous vehicle only makes certain 
outcomes more likely than others, but does not determine which 
outcome manifests. Taken together, there is significant conceptual 
distance between the intentional, unconstrained, and directly causal 
act of targeting and the restrained time-pressured dilemma under 
which a decision in a trolley-problem style accident scenario takes 
place. 
Yet, while crash-optimization need not necessarily lead to targeting 
for these reasons, it is important to note that such practices are by no 
means excluded, and such stark prospects are explored in more detail 
in the hypothetical outlined below. Instead, attempts towards crash-
optimization may precipitate unintended consequences, which being 
 
http://theconversation.com/are-autonomous-cars-really-safer-than-human-drivers-
90202. 
 11 See Bonnefon et al., supra note 9. 
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likely to become aligned with commercial and personal interests, 
would be difficult to foreclose or dispel. 
I. PRIORITIZING THE OCCUPANT IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
THROUGH TROLLEY-PROBLEM SCENARIOS 
Before moving to discuss the structural biases embodied in crash-
optimization impulses, an under-explored dimension of applying 
trolley-problem ethics needs to be explored which is the foundation of 
the first form of structural discrimination introduced by autonomous 
vehicles.12 This concerns the contextualization of autonomous 
vehicles within trolley-problem ethics, and the legitimating function 
played by that thought-experiment in validating crash-optimization 
impulses that privilege the perspective and interests of the occupant 
over competing concerns, such as third-party bystanders. 
The ethical vantage point for the original trolley-problems placed 
the decision-maker outside of the scenario entirely (pulling levers to 
divert the trolley, or to release the trap-door under a fat-man who will 
fall onto the tracks and stop the trolley in its tracks).13 Thus, in the 
original trolley-problem scenarios, the decision-maker was 
disinterested because she was insulated from both the benefits and the 
consequences of her decision: this abstracted position arguably 
undergirds the ethical nature of the conundrums. 
This independence and impartiality of the decision-maker was 
subsequently lost when trolley-problem ethics were applied to 
autonomous vehicle scenarios because the decision-maker, be it the 
manufacturer14 or the occupant,15 now has a vested stake in the 
outcome. Furthermore, this stake in the outcome is both practical and 
immediate — for the manufacturer, profits are aligned with serving 
the exclusive interests of the customer16 and for the occupant, 
 
 12 I owe the elaboration of this section to Lugar Sungil Choi. 
 13 See EDMONDS, supra note 7, at 140. 
 14 See, e.g., David Z. Morris, Mercedes-Benz’s Self-Driving Cars Would Choose 
Passenger Lives Over Bystanders, FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/ 
10/15/mercedes-self-driving-car-ethics/. 
 15 See Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 5; see also Giuseppe Contissa et al., The 
Ethical Knob: Ethically-Customisable Automated Vehicles and the Law, 25 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELL. & L. 365 (2017) (arguing for equipping autonomous vehicles with a device 
enabling the occupants to ethically customize their vehicles to choose between 
different settings corresponding to different moral approaches in unavoidable accident 
scenarios). 
 16 Recall that corporations are legally-mandated to maximize profits and their 
shareholder values and have been implicated in externalizing costs on a systematic 
basis. See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
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personal safety is an obvious concern despite the possibility to 
inculcate one’s ethical preferences into an autonomous vehicle.17 
Transferring the ethical vantage-point of the decision-maker in trolley-
problem scenarios to the manufacturers or occupants of autonomous 
vehicles risks placing the dilemma into the hands of those who have 
active interests in the outcome. This distorts the ethical underpinning 
of the original thought-experiment, rendering it a legitimation strategy 
for the defense of narrow personal and corporate interests at the 
expense of decisions that would maximize public benefit. 
In present context, framing crash-optimization as trolley-problems 
for autonomous vehicles privileges their occupants over pedestrians 
and other third-parties.18 The distortion of trolley-problem ethics 
through decisions of the beneficiaries might therefore transform the 
very nature of the trolley-problem from an objectively-based crash-
optimization calculus to one that is subjective and centered upon the 
occupant’s perspective. Thus, the question is transformed from which 
pedestrian is the least worth saving (or the most worth saving) to 
which pedestrian would minimize harm to the passenger.19 This is a very 
different question to that posed by original trolley-problem scenarios. 
Yet such a conclusion is justified by the logic of those ethical thought-
experiments. 
The systematic privileging of the occupant is further exacerbated by 
the sublimation of responsibility for the outcomes that are precipitated 
by autonomous vehicle behavior.20 The lack of responsibility practices, 
capable of consistently identifying, confronting, and addressing such 
problems, will further obscure this type of structured discrimination. 
Further opacity is introduced by the difficulty of establishing the 
ground upon which discrimination is disallowed — while many 
human rights instruments leave the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination open-ended and non-exhaustive,21 access to 
 
POWER 102 (2005). 
 17 See Contissa et al., supra note 15. 
 18 This is because the corporate interests of the manufacturers converge with those 
of the occupants, whom, whether as purchasers of autonomous vehicle services or 
products, are the driving force behind the profitability of those goods and services.  
 19 Patrick Lin touches upon how prioritizing the passengers would lead to certain 
types of logics in the pedestrians it targets. For example, protecting occupants would 
justify the strategy of colliding with the lightest objects and thus systematically 
burdening children with higher levels of risk. See Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 
5, at 72. 
 20 See Hin-Yan Liu, Irresponsibilities, Inequalities and Injustice for Autonomous 
Vehicles, 19 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 193, 194-200 (2017).  
 21 Such grounds are provided in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil 
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autonomous vehicles is hardly an innate or immutable characteristic 
that should warrant such protection from a formally legal perspective. 
This converges with the difficulties encountered with asserting 
responsibilities for autonomous vehicles to subtly shift burdens of risk 
to pedestrians and to other third-parties. 
Public policy must be developed to counter the collusion of narrow 
private interests that configure structures of privilege enjoyed by those 
with access to autonomous vehicles, especially given the difficulties of 
identifying and challenging this reallocation of the risks and costs of 
autonomous vehicles to those who are not directly benefitting from 
them. A starting point may be to democratize the trolley-problem 
thought-experiment as it is applied to autonomous vehicles,22 and to 
aggregate ethical positions taken from the perspectives not only of the 
agent-occupier, but also of the patient-pedestrian and other third-
parties. Rather than let the manufacturers and occupants impose their 
ethical (or practical) preferences unhindered,23 it would be wise for 
society as a whole to debate: first, the impetus towards crash-
optimization and second, the ensuing questions of how to implement 
and monitor the configuration to be adopted. But since crash-
optimization and trolley-problem scenarios, as applied to autonomous 
vehicles, take the thought-experiments beyond abstract and 
disinterested deliberations, an aggregated approach incorporating the 
interests of pedestrians and other third-parties would also be 
necessary. This is the rough equivalent of soliciting the opinions of the 
workers who are tied to the tracks in the original trolley-problems as 
to what the ethically correct course of action should be. 
II. STRUCTURAL BIASES IN CRASH-OPTIMIZATION AND TROLLEY-
PROBLEM ETHICS 
The second type of structural discrimination introduced by the 
autonomous vehicle concerns patterned outcomes as consequences of 
the structured accumulation of hitherto reactive, individuated, and 
 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which provides that: “All persons are equal before the 
law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In 
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” Art. 26, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 22 For an example akin to this point, see MORAL MACHINE, 
http://moralmachine.mit.edu/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).  
 23 See Contissa et al., supra note 15; Morris, supra note 14. 
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isolated decisions in crash-optimization contexts. The terminological 
framing of autonomous vehicles, prejudices towards the continuation 
of discreteness as the analytical lens. In other words, discussing 
autonomy in vehicles smooths analogies towards contemporary 
anthropocentric driving practices where un-networked human beings 
operate vehicles according to individualized training and decision-
making processes. While such an extension of contemporary practices 
appears obvious and unassailable, it is by no means necessary nor 
inevitable. Instead, the patterned outcomes will arise through 
communication and coordination (in a network or system) or 
convergence (through learning algorithms tasked towards achieving 
certain similar goals within similar environmental constraints). 
Thus, a potentially dystopian narrative can be woven by the trinity 
of: the safety improvements promised by the introduction of the 
autonomous vehicle;24 the crash-optimization debate as strained 
through trolley-problem ethics;25 and the cumulative effects of 
centralized, coordinated, or converging tendencies of algorithmic 
policy preferences. Assessing the projected safety benefits of 
introducing autonomous vehicles will be an empirical exercise hinged 
to their performance and thus beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, 
the second form of structural discrimination results from aggregated 
and accumulated outcomes built upon discrete and independent 
events presented in trolley-problem scenarios. Taken together, these 
independent events strongly indicate a disposition towards aggregated 
outcomes that are structural biased and which verge upon systematic 
discrimination. 
Turning first to the distorting effects of straining the behavior of 
autonomous vehicles through the prism of trolley-problem ethics, the 
important characteristics are that the consideration is adopted from 
the perspective of the isolated individual actor.26 The frame, therefore, 
focuses the ethical conundrum upon what course of action should be 
adopted in a given situation, diverts attention away from the impact of 
 
 24 See Marshall, supra note 10 (“[T]ens or even hundreds of thousands of lives 
could be saved by self-driving cars, even if regulators allow less-than-perfect cars on 
the road.”). 
 25 See Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 5. 
 26 The actor’s perspective is important because trolley-problem ethics are built 
upon the choices made by those possessing agency in relation to the autonomous 
vehicle: in other words placing the ethicist in the “driver’s seat.” Trolley-problem 
ethics would look rather different if the decisions were made from the perspective of 
those tied to the tracks, those deciding upon public policy for how society should 
solve trolley-problems, or those who are assigned to mitigate or insure against such 
risks. 
  
158 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:149 
those decisions upon third-parties, and obscures the prospect of 
cumulative effects. In other words, the trolley-problem’s myopic focus 
upon the causes and consequences of a single scenario overlooks the 
possibility that the results will yield patterns of externalities and 
induce trends that cannot be predicted by studying the ethical 
justifiability of the decision in isolation.27 A rough analogy can be 
drawn with the concept of emergence to illustrate these effects — 
complex and unforeseen consequences can arise through accretion 
from mere adherence to simple rules.28 Studying those rules or their 
application in isolation would not yield indications of complexity, let 
alone be able to account for the resultant intricacies. Similarly, 
studying trolley-problem ethics will not indicate the broader impacts 
and effects of accumulating a succession of individually justifiable 
decisions. It may be that individually justifiable decisions may, in 
aggregation, result in disastrous outcomes. 
The concern raised about aggregated outcomes becomes important 
because of the potential for autonomous vehicles to operate upon 
similar, or even identical, algorithms.29 In other words, the coding for 
autonomous vehicles could be compiled in a centralized manner by 
the developer or manufacturer and then broadly distributed: the effect 
being to multiply any algorithmic policy preferences that might have 
been implicitly or explicitly incorporated. Even the simplest of rules 
written into the code for autonomous vehicles could cascade a range 
of relatively consistent but unforeseen outcomes depending on the 
situation.30 Patterns emerge when such outcomes are aggregated, and 
these patterns are indicative of structural biases in the ensuing 
allocation of burdens and benefits in relation to the functioning of the 
autonomous vehicles. Because this variant of structural discrimination 
arises primarily from the hand-coded algorithms, it may be easier to 
rectify since the structural discriminatory effects arise primarily from 
magnifying and spreading its effects. 
 
 27 Again, that the consideration of the decision-maker’s perspective is problematic 
because it assumes the autonomous vehicle ethics should be descended from those 
who drive. Even when ethical considerations are removed, however, there are 
pragmatic commercial incentives towards saving the occupants over the pedestrians 
for vehicle manufacturers who are financially rewarded for favoring the lives of the 
occupant-purchasers. 
 28 See JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 9-32 (1997); MELANIE 
MITCHELL, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 56-70 (2011). 
 29 This claim is grounded on the likelihood that manufacturers will converge upon 
certain types of autonomous vehicle platforms, analogous to the Microsoft/Macintosh 
platforms.  
 30 GLEICK, supra note 28, at 9-32; MITCHELL, supra note 28, at 56-70. 
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Alternatively, absent centralization, learning algorithms may 
converge upon types of behavior that are adaptively optimized to 
reach certain goals in the context of given constraints. Much of the 
present hype around artificial intelligence involves the contemporary 
advances in machine learning, and in particular its subset of deep 
learning, which have proven to be immensely successful in solving 
persistent problems such as image recognition.31 Machine learning is 
where an algorithm is no longer hand coded such that its output is 
pre-determined.32 Rather machine learning algorithms possess 
flexibility in their capacity to adapt and improve with iterative 
feedback.33 In Tom Mitchell’s broad definition of learning: “A 
computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to 
some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at 
task T, as measured by P, improves with experience E.”34 In this sense, 
machine learning is thus really an optimization process which 
improves iteratively without necessarily being taught what to do. 
Similar effects can then occur through cascades in communication, 
where members of a fleet or brand of autonomous vehicles then share 
the winning strategies arrived at by one of its members. But with the 
case of learning algorithms, this convergence upon a consistent and 
repetitive pattern of behavior need not even be based upon 
communication and coordination (that is to say that communication 
and coordination can give rise to structural discrimination, but are not 
necessary in contexts involving learning algorithms). This is because 
the optimization function of learning algorithms will converge upon 
patterns of behavior where the specified goal and the environmental 
constraints are similar (and will likely do so in unforeseeable ways).35 
This feeds into another blind spot of trolley-problem ethics. The 
calculus is conducted with seemingly featureless and identical “human 
units,” as the variable being emphasized is the quantity of harm rather 
than its character or nature.36 The remedy to this broad equality is 
 
 31 See generally IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING (2016) (explaining the 
history, the overview, and the modern application of “deep learning”). 
 32 See generally id. 
 33 See generally id. 
 34 TOM MITCHELL, MACHINE LEARNING 2 (1997). 
 35 An intuitive way to grasp this is to consider the visual aesthetics of Google’s Deep 
Dream Generator. While the generated works appear to be unique, an identifiable aesthetic 
emerges from repetitive overall patterns that make each work conform to a certain style. 
See DEEP DREAM GENERATOR, https://deepdreamgenerator.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2018). 
 36 The set-up for the original trolley-problem dilemmas make it quite clear that 
the relevant dimensions are of action and inaction, and the number of human beings 
who are in harm’s way. See generally EDMONDS, supra note 7. 
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found in the non-identity problem which underscores the fact that 
different lives are saved and sacrificed. This fact is well-hidden in 
assertions that there will be a net saving of lives usually expressed in 
statistics.37 The non-identity problem infuses individuality into 
otherwise utilitarian considerations and thus brings trolley-problem 
considerations closer to real-world scenarios. 
The prospect of recognizing individual characteristics, however, 
threatens to open the floodgates concerning which features and whose 
interests can and will be recognized and what weighting these should 
be accorded. To some extent this has already taken place where 
gestures were made towards a dilemma between diverting an 
autonomous vehicle to hit either a motorcyclist who wears a helmet or 
another who does not. As Patrick Lin observes, adherence to a 
principle aimed at minimizing harm would result in the autonomous 
vehicle hitting the helmeted motorcyclist because her odds of 
surviving the accident are higher, yet such an outcome places burdens 
upon exactly those who adopted prudential measures to minimize 
their exposure to risk.38 This example neatly encapsulates the 
structural concerns of centralized preferences and risk allocation 
because it illustrates the potential for certain groups to consistently 
bear a greater burden by factoring their characteristics into the 
utilitarian crash-optimization framework. 
But the non-identity problem, by eroding the staunch equality of 
individuals as expressed in the trolley-problem, imports the prospect 
of privileging certain characteristics or penalizing others in the pursuit 
of crash-optimization. At the level of the individual decision, the 
effects of which are isolated from each other, resolving the dilemma in 
either direction may remain ethically justifiable and socially acceptable 
because the ethically correct course of action remains sufficiently 
contentious. 
The issue that the non-identity problem raises in the context of 
autonomous vehicles is not so much that individual lives may either 
be saved or lost as a direct consequence of introducing autonomous 
vehicles, but rather that the same centralized and coordinated rules 
govern those decisions. As a result, the prospect for the same 
algorithmic preferences controlling the vehicles to be replicated across 
any number of such vehicles leads to the possibility for identical 
responses that are governed by the same rule-structure. This in turn 
 
 37 See Patrick Lin, The Ethics of Saving Lives With Autonomous Cars Is Far Murkier 
Than You Think, WIRED (July 30, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/07/the-
surprising-ethics-of-robot-cars/. 
 38 See Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 5, at 73-74. 
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creates a systemic and collective dimension whereby the generated 
outcomes will be reliably and systematically skewed according to the 
coded preferences, whether intentional or not. The crucial 
differentiator is thus the removal of hitherto discrete and independent 
actions undertaken by individuals and the range and diversity of 
available responses that flow as a result.39 The subsequent 
harmonization in accumulating these responses skews together results 
in systematic biases in relation to certain sets of characteristics. If the 
preferred or penalized preferences map onto individual or group 
characteristics for which discriminating based on those characteristics 
is impermissible,40 these structured biases have been translated into 
systematic discrimination. 
Thus systematic discrimination looks very much like discrimination, 
but cannot readily be challenged as breaching legal anti-discrimination 
provisions as such. This is because the outcomes are patterned 
through a consistent aggregation of small and discrete decisions that 
are biased in a certain direction, but may not reflect discriminatory 
intent. In other words, the aggregated outcomes converge upon the 
outcome-space that maps onto discrimination, but legal recognition 
for such effects as discrimination are unlikely to be forthcoming. A 
variant of this argument has been elaborated upon by Scott Veitch, 
when he asks rhetorically: “What registers in law as a wrong? This 
question has a deceptively simple answer: what registers in law as a 
wrong is a breach of the law.”41 
Difficulties lie ahead for those seeking to challenge this potential for 
systematically discriminatory outcomes. The framework of the trolley-
problem is misaligned with the realities of autonomous vehicle 
operation by foregrounding isolated individual decisions made from 
the agent-occupier perspective, as discussed above, while overlooking 
more subtle cumulative impact of those actions. As the technology is 
 
 39 The idea that individuals would meaningfully “decide” upon a course of action 
during the split-seconds that precede an accident might be idealizing such scenarios. 
The point, however, under crash-optimization logics is two-fold: first that the course 
of action is determined beforehand such that it is proactive rather than reactive; and 
second that the course of actions is patterned and cumulative rather than discrete and 
unconnected.  
 40 See Art. 26, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 41 SCOTT VEITCH, LAW AND IRRESPONSIBILITY: ON THE LEGITIMATION OF HUMAN 
SUFFERING 92 (2007). Veitch continues: “Strictly speaking, then, it is not any 
particular loss — physical suffering, economic harm, or whatever — that registers as 
such, but rather only that suffering or harm is given legal cognisance. If there is 
suffering that involves no breach of the law, there is no wrong.” Id.  
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capable of placing identical programming in a range of vehicles, or 
where learning algorithms arrive at similar strategies given the goals 
sought and constraints imposed, the impact of those decisions become 
readily aggregated. Yet, algorithmic preferences can be defended on 
the basis that each individual decision is justifiable so long as the 
overall policies are designed to minimize overall harm since any 
discriminatory effect is seemingly tangential due to a lack of intention 
(and possibly also foreseeability).42 
Thus, cumulative impacts remain legally unrecognized. Objections 
to claims of structural discrimination can be readily resisted because of 
the difficulties associated with articulating the harm in theory and 
demonstrating the harm in practice. To illustrate the liminal position 
of such structural discrimination, consider the fundamental human 
right to equal protection enshrined in Article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: “the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination [on non-exhaustive grounds].”43 Structural 
discrimination as identified and elaborated here appears both to fall 
outside the scope of this provision while being simultaneously 
incongruous to the protections that it affords. 
III. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE IMMUNITY DEVICE 
THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT 
While any discriminatory consequences emerging from these 
processes will be structural and consistent in nature, at this point they 
remain passive, implicit, and even unintended. The concern is that the 
 
 42 In the context of structural discrimination in the context of urban design, the 
need to demonstrate discriminatory intent has proved to be a difficult hurdle to clear. 
See Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through 
Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L. J. 1836, 1979-87 (2015) (holding 
that “[t]he plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by [defendant’s 
discriminatory act]” to trigger strict scrutiny (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)). This position was subsequently 
confirmed in Memphis v. Greene, where even clear disparate impact was insufficient to 
ground a claim of discriminatory intent. 451 U.S. 100, 128-29 (1981). The lack of 
discriminatory intent may scupper any and all attempts to ground claims of 
discrimination where AI is concerned for the simple observation that AI do not 
“intend” anything. If clear disparate impact is insufficient to overcome the 
discriminatory intent requirement, it is foreseeable that decisions made and influenced 
by AIs would be largely insulated from legal allegations and challenges underpinned 
by discrimination.  
 43 See Art. 26, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added). 
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crash-optimization discourse, when coupled with the non-identity 
problem, paves the way towards seemingly justifiable, even 
permissible, forms of active and intentional discrimination. Making 
this leap involves flipping the utilitarian calculus — rather than 
attempting to minimize harm in unavoidable situations, that aim 
instead will be to maximize the collective well-being of society. 
What if the decision as to whom the autonomous vehicle were to hit 
included considerations of an individual’s positive traits, such as 
innate talent, cultured ability, or latent potential? As Joseph Louis 
Lagrange quipped after Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier, widely 
acknowledged as the father of modern chemistry, was guillotined: “It 
took them only an instant to cut off this head, and one hundred years 
might not suffice to reproduce its like.”44 In this vein, would society 
not have an interest, albeit a potentially perverse one, in programming 
its autonomous vehicles to preserve the lives of its prized scientific 
and cultural elite in pursuit of the public benefit and greater good? 
Establishing protective preferences for certain categories of persons is 
implicit in the emotional appeal when school buses are inserted into 
the trolley-problem dilemma. The presence of children invokes our 
intuitive responses that the lives of the young and innocent are 
intrinsically worth protecting, yet the impermissibility of 
discrimination on the basis of age has been highlighted in this 
context.45 This emphasizes the distance between the ethical and legal 
quandaries that arise where policies are anchored in actions that 
would be permissible, or at least justifiable, as individual actions. In 
Patrick Lin’s example,46 an individual choosing to allocate the risk to 
the elderly woman in a trolley-problem scenario could justify their 
actions on a range of socially acceptable reasons. Elevating such an 
individual preference to a collective system that repeatedly allocates 
risk along such lines, however, would constitute systematic 
discrimination on the grounds of sex and age that would be legally 
impermissible and broadly undesirable. Thus, individualized ethics 
may legitimize defensible yet short-sighted policies that make for 
terrible cumulative consequences. 
Extending the question of protective preferences beyond the 
tenuously justifiable grounds of merit and individual capacity, what 
about policies that protect individuals with social or political status, or 
financial capital? At the moment, our political leaders and diplomatic 
 
 44 RALPH HERMON MAJOR, THE DOCTOR EXPLAINS 134-35 (1931). 
 45 See Lin, Why Ethics Matters, supra note 5, at 70-71. 
 46 See id. 
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representatives clearly enjoy high levels of personal protection, which 
is not broadly provided to the ordinary citizen, and those with the 
financial resources are permitted to purchase additional security. In 
the former situation, it is arguable that the extra protection merely 
offsets the additional risks borne by those leading public lives and 
those who hold offices serving the public good. At this stage at least, it 
appears that any policy preferences which are implemented in favor of 
exceptional and important individuals, whom society has 
demonstrated vested interests in protecting, is consistent with the 
current policies. In the latter situation, however, the arrangement may 
simply be one of markets and commodities, with security being 
purchased as a tradable good like any other. Here the lines of 
justifiability begin to blur because policy preferences become 
unhinged to the broader public benefit. Moreover, trolley-problem 
crash scenarios invoke a zero-sum game — the preference to protect 
one party in the dilemma diverts the risk to the other party. While the 
contemporary purchasing of private security is not unproblematic, it 
remains arguable that an individual purchasing additional security 
does not directly displace dangers to other parties as a result of this 
decision. In other words, direct externalities are generated by 
decisions in trolley-problem scenarios that need to be factored into the 
holistic calculus when considering which individuals require the 
protection for societal well-being. 
Pursuing this logic to accord greater protection to certain 
individuals or groups in society, it would not be implausible or 
unreasonable for a large entity, like the manufacturers of autonomous 
vehicles, to issue what I would call here an “immunity device” — the 
bearer of such a device would become immune to collisions with 
autonomous vehicles. With the ubiquity of smart personal 
communication devices, it would not be difficult to develop a 
transmitting device to this end which signals the identity of its owner. 
Such an amulet would protect its owner in situations where an 
autonomous vehicle finds itself careening towards her. It would have 
the effect of deflecting the car away from that individual and thereby 
divert the car to engage in a new trolley-problem style dilemma 
elsewhere. If the justifications for the bearer of the immunity device 
are sufficiently strong, and their numbers suitably restricted, this 
might be a practical response to the new quandaries introduced by 
autonomous vehicles. After all, a human being behind the wheel in an 
identical situation would likely make the same decision, for example, 
if presented with the choice and ability to hit an ordinary member of 
  
2018] Three Types of Structural Discrimination 165 
the public to avoid killing a Nobel laureate or an architectural genius47 
in an unavoidable crash. 
But this appears to be the thinnest end of a very large wedge. The 
scenario introduced above is binary and absolute because the 
immunity device offers complete protection. Yet, if the technology 
becomes available it is difficult to see how proliferation can be 
contained. Developing the immunity device would introduce the 
ability for cars to communicate with their potential victims’ devices in 
the event of an “accident” (now a metaphorical term since 
eventualities are calculated), and a range of pressures would push 
these capabilities into desperate or greedy hands. For obvious 
functional reasons, however, a widespread system of immunity devices 
would be impracticable and self-defeating. Instead, hierarchical 
nuances would have to be introduced — essentially a status ranking 
system that eases the trolley-problem calculus. Individuals occupying 
public spaces would essentially be playing a game of trump cards with 
each other in the event of a trolley-problem involving an autonomous 
vehicle. Whoever bears the highest status aversion device would be 
spared at the expense of those who possess lower status ones. This 
would rapidly become an uncomfortable outcome for what initially 
appeared to be a satisfactory configuration of benefits and burdens 
imposed by the autonomous vehicle of the future. 
At this point, we can reinsert the targeting issue that Patrick Lin 
suggested as the corollary of crash-optimization. It might be that 
cascading trump card calculations will become both overly complex 
and unnecessarily convoluted to achieve the desired outcome. As a 
heuristic to the endeavor, the solution may simply be for an 
autonomous vehicle to target the lowest value individual in range of 
the unavoidable collision. It would appear that the consequence of 
conducting a cascade of trolley-problem dilemmas through a series of 
trump card comparisons would ultimately lead to the result of the 
individual bearing the lowest value being hit anyway: so why not short 
circuit the whole process? Where the system of risk allocation is 
hinged to the individual’s value to society, or at least perceived to 
reflect this ranking, such a targeting policy appears to equate to 
causing the least amount of objectively determined damage to society 
and thereby becomes justifiable. 
This then asks the question as to how to allocate the particular 
status an individual should possess, and therefore the concomitant 
 
 47 Appropriate in the trolley-problem context because Antoni Gaudi is perhaps the 
most famous fatality involving an actual urban tram. See EDMONDS, supra note 7, at 53. 
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level of risk that she should bear in relation to autonomous vehicles. 
All its variants run against the bold proclamation in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights that “[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.”48 Were a meritocratic system to be 
implemented, we might end up with the more palatable situation 
sketched above. More likely, however, given the commercial context 
of developing and marketing autonomous vehicles, is that the 
distribution will be made on economical grounds given the financial 
opportunities for profit-making that such a system would introduce. It 
is easy to envisage existing customer loyalty or benefit programs that 
extend into this realm when offered as additional security or safety. 
Similarly, insurance companies might market such a system of devices 
in order to cover the potential decline of revenue in insuring human 
drivers that would be precipitated by the widespread introduction of 
autonomous vehicles. 
It remains possible, however, that if the immunity devices were to 
be distributed by a public authority, this would enable that authority 
to nudge behavior accordingly.49 While such nudging can be used to 
incentivize laudable behaviors, for example rewarding those with low 
carbon footprints or those who have remained outside of the penal 
system, there is also the more dystopian prospect for the immunity 
devices to be allocated according to an individual’s social credit.50 In 
other words, the ability to centralize the allocation of risk and reward 
in the context of autonomous vehicles enables this scheme to be rolled 
into broader incentive structures and nudging practices exercised by 
public authorities. The involvement of public authorities, however, 
could formally push these issues into the realm of administrative law 
and human rights, which might hold the potential for greater scrutiny. 
That said, the difficulty with demonstrating discriminatory intent, 
 
 48 Art. 1, G.A. Res. 217 A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 49 My thanks to Lugar Sungil Choi again for making me elaborate upon this point. 
On nudging, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN 
THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (2016); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 413 (2015).  
 50 See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, Big Data Meets Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its 
Citizens, WIRED (Oct. 21, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-government-
social-credit-score-privacy-invasion (“[I]n China . . . the government is developing the 
Social Credit System (SCS) to rate the trustworthiness of 1.3 billion citizens.”); Mara 
Hvistendahl, Inside China’s Vast New Experiment in Social Ranking, WIRED (Dec. 14, 
2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/ (“[I]n 2014, the 
Chinese government announced it was developing what it called a system of ‘social 
credit.’”).  
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especially in the context of protecting virtuous individuals (the zero-
sum displacement of risk upon others being largely overlooked) would 
most likely render these additional tools useless. 
Turning to the market for trading autonomous vehicle trump card 
ratings, a particularly interesting scenario would be where the trading 
took place in a closed market. In such a scenario, it is the relative 
differential that will be valued and effective — individuals seeking a 
protective advantage would need to possess a higher rating in 
comparison to others within a closed system. A zero-sum game would 
thus be implemented where individuals seeking high status would be 
required to purchase the differential protection from other members 
within the same society, thereby instigating a competitive and 
polarizing scheme. This shows the potential for rapid evolution from a 
protective system initiated to safeguard societal interests into a pure 
market system that thrives on exaggerating the differences between 
members of the same society. 
Beyond marketing such devices, their allocation could run along the 
lines of rewards and punishments, akin to the social credit system 
discussed above. In addition to receiving public honors, for example, 
one’s relative value in the protective schema might be enhanced to 
reflect society’s increased interest in the individual. Conversely, it 
might even be possible to allocate additional risks as a form of 
punishment for societal transgressions — those who have acted to the 
detriment of society might be forced to bear a burden of increased risk 
as a form of restitution or compensation. These may be more 
justifiable, and societally aligned, ways of developing such a scheme. 
Yet, however the final structure may be, its hierarchical effects are 
evident, as are the tendencies towards heuristics, categorization, and 
entrenchment. And again, given the commercial context, these 
societally aligned schemes might, at best, operate in tandem with the 
market-based approach in a blended hybrid system. 
Leaving aside the practical details associated with the future market 
for autonomous vehicles — such as whether manufacturers will offer 
such systems, whether they would be preferential towards their own 
clientele, and whether they would coordinate and centralize such a 
scheme — the ramification of such a system is that risk of injury and 
death shifts towards prevention rather than cure. Rather than 
enforcing accident insurance upon human drivers to cover for their 
future faults, this system would instead place a large share of the 
burden upon the ordinary citizen to avoid or minimize the likelihood 
of injury arising from autonomous vehicles. This relocates burdens 
away from the beneficiaries of autonomous vehicles and their use to 
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bystanders who do not necessarily have a stake in the introduction of 
these technologies.51 In pre-determining the allocation of risks and 
costs in advance of any accidents, the remaining fault that must be 
covered by the occupier (and in reality be passed on to the 
manufacturer of the autonomous vehicle) would be for departures 
from the course of action that has been promised in advance, and not 
for the actual outcome caused by the autonomous vehicle. 
IV. STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE CORPORATE PROFIT-DRIVEN 
CONTEXT 
To make matters even more complex, autonomous vehicles are not 
being developed from any semblance of a transparent and neutral 
situation, but are rather driven forward by private corporate entities 
seeking to make material profits from their efforts and investments.52 
Even if such motives do not taint the product directly, preferences that 
increase profits are likely to become embedded in the decisional 
architecture of the autonomous vehicle that a company produces.53 
Profitability and client interests collide in such instances to externalize 
the risks to third-parties.54 It is neither uncommon nor unreasonable 
for a vehicle manufacturer today to emphasize the safety features of its 
 
 51 In a different context, but converging upon similar conclusions, are the objections 
that the introduction of autonomous vehicles would propagate existing discrimination and 
increase social segregation, and that it would marginalize human beings from time-
honored public infrastructure. See Ian Bogost, How Driverless Cars Will Change the Feel of 
Cities, ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2017/11/life-in-a-driverless-city/545822/; Ian Bogost, Will Robocars Kick Humans Off City 
Streets?, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2016/06/robocars-only/488129/ [hereinafter Will Robocars]. 
 52 See Bogost, Will Robocars, supra note 51 (“No matter the scenario, one thing’s 
for sure: When Silicon Valley runs our automobiles, they’ll do so according to the 
business practices of the technology industry, not according to the principles of local 
urban planning and civic life.”). 
 53 See generally BAKAN, supra note 16. 
 54 For example, the background to the recent Uber self-driving car fatality lies in 
an Executive Order made by Arizona Governor Doug Ducey to undertake “any 
necessary steps to support the testing and operation of self-driving cars on public 
roads within Arizona.” Ariz. Exec. Order 2015–09 (Aug. 25, 2018), 
https://azgovernor.gov/file/2660/download?token=nLkPLRi1; Bogost, supra note 2. 
Later, on March 1, 2018, Ducey updated that order to allow fully autonomous driving 
provided that a “minimal risk condition” (in turn meaning a “reasonably safe 
state . . . upon experiencing a failure”) was met by the autonomous vehicle’s systems. 
Under this direction, Arizona residents have been subjected to heighten risks 
associated with traffic as a result of being a real-world test-bed for the application 
of autonomous vehicles. Ariz. Exec. Order 2018–04 (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://azgovernor.gov/file/12514/download?token=6jUxyR_C; Bogost, supra note 2. 
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models that protect its customers and passengers.55 And a human 
driver who takes the decision to hurt others in order to protect her 
own interests similarly acts within the boundaries of social 
acceptability.56 These tendencies might imperceptibly be extended into 
the realm of autonomous vehicles without much commentary, 
deliberation, or evaluation. Yet, when these two characteristics are 
united in the autonomous vehicle, the realities may shift. The vehicle 
subtly transitions between being an artifact towards being an agent — 
from something that is inanimate and subject to human control to 
something that observes, orients, decides, and acts. Crossing this line 
implicates programming that may systematically elevate the safety of 
its customers and occupants over all others, not least because an 
autonomous vehicle would not be able to convincingly make account 
of its decision-making processes. In an important sense, the outcome, 
where the prospect of harm is unavoidable, has not only been 
automated and pre-determined, but these results also become 
multiplied and systematic. 
The private developmental context also imposes restrictions in 
terms of accessibility and influence over prescriptive policies. Not only 
do the technical dimension of the underlying technology create 
barriers that curtail widespread engagement with determining the 
eventual behavior of autonomous vehicles, but the usual political tools 
deployed for oversight and accountability are incapable of penetrating 
the corporation. A prescient warning can be found in Wisconsin v. 
Loomis,57 where a six-year prison sentence was based in part upon the 
report generated by a secret algorithm: because COMPAS was a private 
company’s proprietary software,58 the petition was based upon the 
inability of the defendant to inspect or challenge this process.59 The 
 
 55 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 10; Morris, supra note 14. 
 56 A point of distinction might subsist in the fact that the absence of the very 
possibility of responsibility for autonomous vehicles means that decisions for how 
these should behave need to be specified up front. This is unlike the traditional 
driving scenario whereby human drivers are held to account in retrospect for their 
decisions and actions, a possibility which may justify the discretional latitude which 
human drivers enjoy that might remain out-of-bounds for autonomous vehicles. 
 57 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 2016).  
 58 See id. at 761 (“[T]he developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary 
instrument and a trade secret. Accordingly, it does not disclose how the risk scores are 
determined or how the factors are weighed.”); see also COMPAS Classification, 
EQUIVANT, http://www.equivant.com/solutions/inmate-classification (last visited Apr. 
17, 2018).  
 59 See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757 (“[Defendant] asserts that the . . . use of a COMPAS 
risk assessment at sentencing violates a defendant’s right to due process . . . because the 
proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents him from assessing its accuracy.”); see also id. at 
  
170 University of California, Davis [Vol. 51:149 
opaque nature of the corporation also presents significant obstacles for 
those seeking to challenge how autonomous vehicles will operate, and 
limits the opportunities for increasingly marginalized third-parties to 
raise their concerns. 
To make a legal point here, these technical and formal barriers may 
lead to injustice insofar as harms and damages remain unrecognized as 
legal wrongs or injuries. The notion of wrong implies an infraction 
with potential moral, and possibly legal, consequences and begins to 
assert the need for accountability. Injury as understood in its root 
sense of injuria, meaning an invasion of another’s rights or conversely 
a legally actionable wrong, demonstrates the distance between the 
harm and its (legal) recognition.60 Harms and damages, on the other 
hand, need not bear ethical opprobrium nor legal repercussion unless 
these are recognized and transformed into their ethical and legal 
categories.61 This gap obscures the prospect of damage occurring 
without injury being recognized,62 and this may occur as a direct 
consequence of third-parties being systematically disadvantaged by the 
algorithmic preferences being unable to review or challenge those 
veiled policies. Taken together, both the opportunities to influence the 
behavior of autonomous vehicles and the ability to hold the conduct 
to account become severely curtailed. 
In situations where the occupant of the autonomous vehicle 
(whether termed as a pilot, operator, occupant, passenger, or 
something else entirely) is imputed with responsibility for 
autonomous vehicle accidents, the specter of scapegoating emerges. 
This is both because the human beings in such positions do not 
possess the control, predictability, and foresight required to reliably 
and effectively alter the course of autonomous vehicle behavior; and 
because human beings can only be held in a role-responsibility sense 
of fulfilling obligations, which have been decoupled to the causal-
 
761 (“[Defendant] argues that he is in the best position to refute or explain the COMPAS 
risk assessment, but cannot do so based solely on a review of the scores as reflected in the 
bar charts . . . [U]nless he can review how the factors are weighed and how risk scores are 
determined, the accuracy of the COMPAS assessment cannot be verified.” (footnote 
omitted)). For commentary on the Loomis case, see Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a 
Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-
secret-algorithms.html; Frank Pasquale, Secret Algorithms Threaten the Rule of Law, MIT 
TECH. REV. (June 1, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608011/secret-algorithms-
threaten-the-rule-of-law/. 
 60 See VEITCH, supra note 41, at 85-92. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id.  
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responsibility that the unfortunate consequences demand.63 Where the 
autonomous vehicle is equipped with warnings and other means of 
reverting control back to human drivers, where technology failures or 
accidents appear imminent,64 this might merely insert human beings 
as moral crumple zones65 in human-robot interaction systems.66 As 
long as responsibility for accidents remains legally ambiguous, it will 
be practically expedient and materially profitable to displace liability 
upon human beings who are in the liminal zone between 
simultaneously driving and not driving the (autonomous) vehicle.67 
But this is a different way the law fails to recognize the injury within 
the damage, discussed above,68 that would perpetuate the very sources 
for the lack of this legal recognition. The use of proximate human 
beings as moral crumple zones that absorb legal liability for 
autonomous vehicles may be a less pressing, but still important, form 
 
 63 Along the lines of the development of the two different types of responsibility 
issues, see Hin-Yan Liu, Refining Responsibility: Differentiating Two Types of 
Responsibility Issues Raised by Autonomous Weapons Systems, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS: LAW, ETHICS, POLICY 325, 329 (Nehal Bhuta et al. eds., 2016) (“The 
responsibility of the . . . commander is both limited by [her] lack of control and 
foresight (circumstantial issues) and characterized by the need to fulfil the obligations 
that attach to . . . [her] role (conceptual issues). . . . [T]he commander . . . can either 
argue that the outcomes were not foreseeable or . . . assert that [the commander] had 
discharged [her] role responsibilities.”). 
 64 See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Driver Who Died in a Tesla Crash Using Autopilot 
Ignored at Least 7 Safety Warnings, WASH. POST (June 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/20/the-driver-who-
died-in-a-tesla-crash-using-autopilot-ignored-7-safety-warnings/. 
 65 See M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot 
Interaction 3 (We Robot 2016, Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757236 (defining “moral 
crumple zone” to describe the result of ambiguity within systems of distributed 
control due to the incongruities between control and responsibility. Incongruities 
exist because control has become distributed across multiple actors while the social 
and legal conceptions of responsibility remained generally about an individual). 
 66 See id. at 19-22 (explaining that in the instance when accidents are caused by a 
miscommunication between a driverless car and a human-driven car, “responsibility is 
shifted to other drivers on the road, and these drivers become the moral crumple 
zone, taking responsibility for a failure where, in fact, control over the situation is 
shared”).  
 67 For example, “the letter of the Arizona executive order seems to suggest that 
the human operator is on the hook for any traffic infractions while he or she is in the 
vehicle, even if it’s in fully autonomous mode.” Bogost, supra note 2; see also Ariz. 
Exec. Order 2018–04 (Mar. 1, 2018) (“[T]he person . . . operating the fully 
autonomous vehicle may be issued a traffic citation or other applicable penalty in the 
event the vehicle fails to comply with traffic and/or motor vehicle laws.”). 
 68 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.  
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of structural discrimination, since its presence will consistently shield 
the corporations that design and deploy the technology from public 
scrutiny and legal liability, as well as the more distal human beings 
who benefit financially from the operation of autonomous vehicles. 
V. STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION IN URBAN DESIGN AND LAW 
REVISITED 
The lack of clear and unambiguous liability structures dilutes 
incentives towards producing autonomous vehicles which are safe not 
only for their occupants but also for the public at large. The 
discriminatory potentials embodied in the autonomous vehicle and the 
systems which will grow around in support of their operation, 
however, has broadly evaded the radar. Thus, the incentives towards 
creating non-discriminatory autonomous vehicle systems are 
immature. Given the prospect for public-private partnerships to form 
around the deployment of autonomous vehicle systems as surrogates 
for truly public transportation systems,69 a more traditional form of 
structural discrimination may arise. This is due to the segregating 
effects of such technology that privilege wealth and education, and the 
predicted transformation of urban areas through the process 
embedding autonomous vehicles and their supporting systems.70 
Thus, beyond the aggregated effects of crash-optimization 
calculations is a form of structural discrimination that may arise and 
be woven into the very fabric of urban space.71 Sarah Schindler has 
contextualized the concept of “architectural exclusion,” which 
involves “the exclusionary effects of . . . seemingly innocuous features 
of the built environment.”72 It might be asserted, if Lawrence Lessig is 
 
 69 See Bogost, supra note 2 (“Given sufficient economic incentive to pursue 
public-private partnerships between municipalities and technology 
companies . . . states might choose to adopt industry-friendly regulatory policy in 
exchange for changes to the urban environment.”); see also Cecilia Kang, Pittsburgh 
Welcomed Uber’s Driverless Car Experiment. Not Anymore., N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/technology/pittsburgh-ubers-driverless-car-
experiment.html. 
 70 See Bogost, Will Robocars, supra note 51 (“Once non-local technology 
companies have a direct impact on the financing and planning of urban spaces, the 
negative impact on less white, less wealthy communities could be severe.”). 
 71 Schindler, supra note 42, at 1943 (“[M]onumental structures of concrete and 
steel embody a systematic social inequality . . . that, after a time, becomes just another 
part of the landscape.” (quoting Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 
DAEDALUS 121, 124 (1980))). 
 72 Id. at 1939-40.  
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correct that architecture constitutes a modality of regulation,73 that 
structural discrimination can literally be built into the fabric of urban 
space.74 Unfortunately, because law here is relegated to a regulatory 
modality on par with architectural regulation, their parity as 
regulatory modalities suggests that legal remedies will be ineffectual 
against structural discrimination as embodied in urban space. This is 
perhaps why the most that can be said of such practices is that they 
are forms of architectural exclusion, as opposed to “architectural 
discrimination,” which would legalistically be non sequitur. 
Indeed, the facilitation and impediment with regard to 
transportation are well-documented strategies of architectural 
exclusion, and ready analogies can be drawn with precedents found in 
public transit and road infrastructure.75 The introduction of 
autonomous vehicles will add nothing new in this sense, but merely 
exacerbate existing trends of architectural exclusion. Perhaps the most 
famous example is of Robert Moses and the bridges over the parkways 
of Long Island which are “extraordinarily low.” In the words of 
Langdon Winner: 
It turns out, however, that the two hundred or so low-hanging 
overpasses on Long Island were deliberately designed to 
achieve a particular social effect . . . . Automobile-owning 
whites of “upper” and “comfortable middle” classes, as he 
called them, would be free to use the parkways for recreation 
and commuting. Poor people and blacks, who normally use 
public transit, were kept off the roads because the twelve-foot 
tall buses could not get through the overpasses. One 
consequence was to limit access of racial minorities and low-
income groups to Jones Beach, Moses’s widely acclaimed 
public park.76 
 
 73 See id. at 1940 (explaining Lawrence Lessig’s regulatory theory that behavior 
may be regulated or constrained, in part, by architecture); see also Lawrence Lessig, 
The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 661, 662-63 (1998) (arguing that, as one of 
the four modalities of regulation, architecture can “restrict and enable in a way that 
directs or affects behavior”); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyber Law 
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999) (arguing that architecture is a “fourth 
feature of real space that regulates behavior”). 
 74 See Schindler, supra note 42 at 1953-73 (providing examples of architectural 
exclusion). 
 75 See id. at 1960-72 (showing that architectural exclusion comes in the form of 
decisions about where to place transit stops; highway routes; bridge exits; road 
infrastructure; one-way, dead-end, and curvy streets; and road signs). 
 76 Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 124-25 (1980) 
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What is particularly astounding is the permanence of architectural 
regulation, and in this sense, exclusion — “[f]or generations after 
Moses has gone and the alliances he forged have fallen apart, his 
public works, especially the highways and bridges he built to favor the 
use of the automobile over the development of mass transit, will 
continue to shape [New York City].”77 The longevity of architectural 
exclusion might suggest its place along constitutional provisions as 
literally entrenched in terms of its fundamental and unyielding nature, 
being positioned beyond the sway of law and politics. Yet, unlike 
constitutional provisions, or even more mundane legislation, 
architectural exclusion is lifted beyond public debate, scrutiny, and 
accountability. While emphasis should be placed upon “the 
importance of technical arrangements that precede the use of the 
things in question,”78 Winner continues to observe that: 
To our accustomed way of thinking, technologies are seen as 
neutral tools that can be used well or poorly, for good, evil, or 
something in between. But we usually do not stop to inquire 
whether a given device might have been designed and built in 
such a way that it produces a set of consequences logically and 
temporally prior to any of its professed uses.79 
The question then becomes what such prior consequences would be 
considered before the introduction of autonomous vehicles. Given the 
noted biases and disparate impacts observed for aligned technologies 
— even “just” big data80 — it is difficult to imagine that autonomous 
vehicles could be designed and deployed in a socially neutral fashion. 
It should also be noted that, while there is substantiating evidence that 
Moses had intended for his architecture to be exclusionary, such 
intention (or even recklessness) is not necessary to bring about such 
consequences: “Rather, one must say that the technological deck has 
 
(emphasis is added because the exclusionary barriers are placed to differentiate ease of 
access to that public park). 
 77 Id. at 124 (emphasis in original). This view is neatly encapsulated by Lee 
Koppleman’s statement: “The old son-of-a-gun had made sure that buses would never 
be able to use his goddamned parkways.” Id. at 124 (quoting ROBERT A. CARO, THE 
POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 952 (1974) (emphasis in 
original)).  
 78 Id. at 125 (emphasis in original).  
 79 Id. (emphasis in original).  
 80 See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (showing that discriminatory tendencies exist even if 
they have not been manually programed, whether on purpose or by accident, because 
discrimination may be an artifact of the data mining process itself). 
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been stacked long in advance to favor certain social interests, and that 
some people are bound to receive a better hand than others.”81 
This line of argumentation suggests that the autonomous vehicle 
will usher in a new era replete with its own supporting infrastructure, 
which in turn will repeat previous versions of discrimination and 
segregation that have accompanied analogous developments in the 
past. The production of laws that dis-privilege pedestrians, for 
example, have a clear precedent in criminalizing jaywalking, 
unsurprisingly spurred by the growing automobile industry in the 
1920s.82 Not only were pedestrians “essentially written out of the 
equation when it came to designing streets,” but “law-enforcement 
tend[s] to identify with a motorist’s perspective,”83 such that both 
urban design and law have historically conspired to segregate public 
space and to marginalize pedestrians. 
Autonomous vehicles are likely to exacerbate the developments 
introduced by the automobile, since these are likely to adopt different 
strategies for confronting the challenges of navigating traffic than 
human drivers currently deploy. Ultimately, the efficiency and safety 
concerns that undergirded the introduction of jaywalking laws may 
justify the total exclusion of human beings from transport 
thoroughfares optimized for autonomous vehicles.84 Excluding human 
beings would be a continuation of the privatization of public space,85 
this time under the guise of new technological capabilities. Such 
effects are likely to be spurred on by the need for cities to be 
competitive to raise the necessary funds to integrate autonomous 
vehicle infrastructure into their urban spaces.86 As with Winner’s 
observation of the longevity of Moses’ public works in New York City, 
however, the manner in which this infrastructure for autonomous 
 
 81 Winner, supra note 76 at 125-26. 
 82 See Aidan Lewis, Jaywalking: How the Car Industry Outlawed Crossing the Road, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26073797. 
 83 Id. 
 84 For example, Copenhagen’s fully-automated Metro functions reliably and 
effectively in part because human beings are excluded from its tracks.  
 85 See generally ANNA MINTON, GROUND CONTROL: FEAR AND HAPPINESS IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CITY (2012) (arguing that the exclusion of people on 
properties built and owned by private corporations in British cities not only 
transformed these cities but also the nature of public space). 
 86 In December 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation launched “Smart 
City Challenge” to incentivize mid-sized cities to develop ideas for an integrated smart 
transportation system through national competition. See Smart City Challenge, U.S. 
DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/smartcity (last visited Apr. 17, 2018). 
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vehicles is developed and the logics which it supports will dictate 
human behavior in the built environment long into the future. 
Two particular problems arise with the prospect of further 
architectural exclusion arising from autonomous vehicle 
infrastructure. First, the streets are the paragon of public space,87 and 
the cradle of freedom of speech and assembly essential to democratic 
debate and legitimate public protest.88 Once the exclusionary features 
of the infrastructure are in place, it may be that such developments 
would be especially difficult to confront and resist because it removes 
the very means of assembly and protest that have traditionally 
precipitated change.89 Reaching back towards the analogies between 
law and architecture as different modalities of regulation, curbing the 
ability to challenge and change the built environment may be similar 
to entrenchment of legal provisions.90 Furthermore, there may be 
more subtle forms of discouragement at play:91 for example those 
individuals without immunity devices or relatively high scores in the 
trump card hierarchy may avoid certain streets (or even avoid the 
streets altogether) for the increased risks displaced upon them. 
Crowds may even disperse during events where high status people are 
planned to congregate for similar reasons. This trajectory of logic 
would culminate in areas where members of the public are issued a 
“notice” to stay “off” the streets where autonomous vehicles are 
present — an extension of contemporary jaywalking laws — that may 
 
 87 See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 273-90 (2d ed. 2007); see also JANE 
JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 29 (1961) (“Streets and their 
sidewalks, the main public places of a city, are its most vital organs.”). 
 88 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (“[P]ublic streets and sidewalks 
have been used for public assembly and debate, the hallmarks of a traditional public 
forum.”); see also BARENDT, supra note 87 at 273-90. 
 89 See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (restricting the public’s right to protest by 
upholding a law banning targeted picketing in residential streets due to the unique 
nature and privacy of homes). “One can point to Baron Haussman’s broad Parisian 
thoroughfares, engineered at Louis Napoleon’s direction to prevent any recurrence of 
street fighting of the kind that took place during the revolution of 1848.” Winner, 
supra note 76, at 124. A crude comparison, but apt given how the layout of public 
streets can affect the ability and efficacy of protesting authority and power.  
 90 See generally Hin-Yan Liu, Constitutional Entrenchment: Questions of Legal 
Possibility and Moral Desirability in the United Kingdom, 2 CITY UNIV. HONG KONG L. 
REV. 193 (2010) (showing that entrenchment is a legal protection of certain 
fundamental rights from being repealed by political powers and cannot be abrogated 
like ordinary laws). 
 91 My thanks, again, to Lugar Sungil Choi for this suggestion. 
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then entrench themselves as legal and social practice analogous to how 
jaywalking laws have done since their introduction.92 
Second, the parity of law and architecture as modalities of regulation 
suggest a degree of insulation between the influence of each upon the 
other. The point here is that when attempting to overturn 
architectural exclusion through the law, courts are unlikely to be as 
effectual as attempting to alter legislation through the built 
environment.93 This point is neatly expressed by Schindler: 
Instead of garnering support to pass a law banning poor 
people or people of color from the places in which he did not 
want them — which, if the intent were clear, would not be 
permissible today — Moses used his power as an architect to 
make it physically difficult for certain individuals to reach the 
places from which he desired to exclude them.94 
Any discriminatory effect that is incorporated into the infrastructure 
supporting autonomous vehicles will thus likely be difficult both to 
identify through legal lenses and to challenge in the courts of law. 
This makes this form of structural discrimination introduced by 
autonomous vehicles impervious to legal recognition, despite its 
disparate impacts. 
Thus, technological progress, logistical expedience, safety concerns, 
urban design, and privatization may converge to entrench a 
transportation system dominated by autonomous vehicles that further 
oust the human from physical space and segregate classes of people 
according to their ability to access and use the services provided by 
such systems. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
A more nebulous insight arising from the debates surrounding the 
introduction of autonomous vehicles deploys that technology is a 
mirror to contemporary society and in particular its transport sector. 
That autonomous vehicles promise safer roads and offer a yardstick to 
lambast human drivers95 might conversely suggest that the institution 
 
 92 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Schindler, supra note 42, at 1954. 
 94 Id. (citations omitted). It could also be noted that Moses’ architectural approach 
to social exclusion was significantly longer-lived as a result of it utilizing an 
architectural, as opposed to legal, modality of regulation. See supra notes 79–81 and 
accompanying text.  
 95 See Alex Davies, Uber’s Latest Crash Proves We Need Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Mar. 
25, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/uber-self-driving-crash-tempe-arizona/. 
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and practice of automobile driving is inherently a very dangerous 
activity. Rather than road accident and fatality statistics paving the 
way towards greater and fuller autonomy in vehicular systems, 
perhaps the reflection given to us by autonomous vehicles should 
undergird a re-evaluation of what a road “accident” actually means. 
The contemporary legal setting is such that accidents are framed under 
tort laws under the doctrines of negligence and product defects.96 But 
if the proven and consistent dangers associated with driving become 
visible by technologies that promise to perform the same activities in a 
safer manner, might a more active legal stance be justified? In other 
words, the law might actively recognize the live and active danger 
inherent within driving as an activity, and the imposition of risk upon 
third-parties of undertaking such an activity based upon the 
defamiliarizing vantage point offered by autonomous vehicles. This 
might ground a re-evaluation as to whether the law should continue to 
treat traffic fatalities as “accidents” as marginal and unfortunate 
occurrences that are the by-products of efficient mobility and 
characterized by negligence and failure modalities of responsibility. 
Rather, the law should speak in more active terms of commission. 
A predominant concern in writing this paper was to introduce a 
dystopian scenario97 that may be capable of real-world 
implementation, thereby helping to bring it about. While certain 
aspects of systematic autonomous vehicle discrimination appear 
outlandish and implausible, when spread over several logical steps and 
implemented gradually, these effects may be rendered imperceptible. 
Other aspects, like the possibility of passive structural discrimination, 
appear to be corollaries of networked effects and will be inevitable, 
unless significant attention is paid to avoid the emergence of such 
outcomes.98 
In order to mitigate the worst dimensions of these scenarios, the 
broadest range of participation in the design and development of these 
systems needs to be implemented. This is in order to offset the actor-
orientation adopted by the ethical frameworks and to rebalance 
considerations to those who may have no access or involvement with 
the technology, regulation, or use of autonomous vehicles. This 
redress may also give voice to more marginalized individuals and 
groups within society who would otherwise be imposed greater 
 
 96 See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 
2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (concluding that the current product liability regime is 
probably compatible with the adoption of automated vehicles). 
 97 See supra Part III. 
 98 See supra Part II. 
  
2018] Three Types of Structural Discrimination 179 
burdens without consultation or acquiescence. Broad public 
engagement will also be necessary to establish impermissible types of 
development and will need to occur well in advance of technological 
maturation, and ideally at an earlier stage such that regulation can 
influence design and implementation. Finally, and more prosaically, 
soliciting a broad range of opinion could lessen the prospect for 
regulatory blind-spots and increase the confidence of both those 
driving the technology forward as well as potential users and victims 
of autonomous vehicles. 
Direct countermeasures may need to be developed in order to 
decentralize coding, and to ensure that their operations do not 
coalesce around principles that are too similar. It may be worth 
considering imbuing autonomous vehicles to operate independently to 
some extent, or allow their human occupants to set their own 
preference settings and take responsibility for the outcomes arising 
from their directions.99 Bright regulatory lines may be necessary to 
curb some of the excesses envisaged here, especially to prevent 
precisely the intentional discriminatory systems that might become 
profitably implemented.100 It may be that crash-optimization as a 
framing consideration, being at root of the impulses to minimize total 
harm or maximize societal well-being, should be rendered irrelevant 
and impermissible. In this sense, uncertainty and chance will be 
intentionally implemented as more natural buffers against allegations 
of structured discrimination in order to disrupt patterned outcomes 
that might distill burdens and benefits to particular societal groups. 
Beyond direct interventions, the dystopian scenario predicts the 
alignment of individual personal safety interests and commercial 
profit-driven incentives.101 Regulation could be crafted to intervene 
and disrupt this nexus or impose various limits that decrease such 
drives. On the other end of the spectrum, existing codes of ethics for 
the engineers driving forward these technologies could be extended to 
cover possibilities of discrimination by countenancing the prospect for 
such emergent outcomes.102 By starting this discussion of possible 
veiled systematic effects, the aim of this Article is to raise awareness of 
these undesirable possibilities and to foster a discussion to craft law 
and policy to mitigate at least the worst dimensions of these effects. 
 
 99 See, e.g., Contissa et al., supra note 15. For an opposing perspective, see Lin, 
Adjustable Ethics Settings, supra note 5. 
 100 See supra Part III. 
 101 See supra Part I. 
 102 Lin, The Robot Car, supra note 5. 
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More difficult to counteract, at least through legal mechanisms, are 
the structurally discriminatory impact of architecture and the design 
of the built environment.103 As law and architecture are set on par 
with each other as regulatory modalities, it is their combined effects 
that induce regulatory pressures.104 But their subsidiary status as 
regulatory modalities also suggests that these have limited impact 
upon each other, such that exclusion or discrimination as effectuated 
through architecture will require different strategies for identifying 
and overcoming their effects.105 Even still, impact assessments may be 
required to model the effects of the configuration of autonomous 
vehicle infrastructure before implementation as a bulwark against 
excessive effects. 
This paper has largely treated these three forms of structural 
discrimination as distinct and independent. While each pose difficult 
problems individually, it is likely that the interaction effects will be the 
most pernicious and the most resilient against reform. The common 
denominator underlying structural discrimination is the crash-
optimization imperative (and to some lesser extent, the demands of 
efficiency). A lazy approach would be to mitigate this imperative, for 
example by instilling randomness into the system. The underlying 
problem, however, is that autonomous vehicles are unlikely to remain 
autonomous, but instead will be coordinated in their behavior or will 
converge towards certain outcome patterns.106 Thus, removing the 
overarching goal of crash-optimization will merely displace where the 
problems fall, rather than address the root cause at all. 
 
 103 See supra Part V. 
 104 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 105 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 106 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
